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The discussion which Mr. Fitzpatrick began in the April 1956
issue of THE CATHOLIC LAWYER with his defense of the morality
of the "Right-to-Work" laws is continued by Mr. Morris in the fol-
lowing direct reply.
MR. FITZPATRICK ON THE
MORALITY OF RIGHT-TO-
WORK LAWS-COMMENT
JAMES R. MORRIS*
N A RECENT ARTICLE IN THIS JOURNAL, Bernard H. Fitzpatrick has
demonstrated again a more thoughtful consideration of the issues in-
volved in compulsory union membership than is common.' Nevertheless,
he has arrived at major conclusions some of which appear to this writer
to be untenable. Before advancing to the heart of the issue developed by
the author, a few preliminary comments may be worthwhile.
Mr. Fitzpatrick correctly points out that "... . the moral right of asso-
ciation is a freedom, not a compulsion." But he adds: "what follows
from this, of course, is not that shop cloture is unjustified but that shop
cloture cannot be justified by the principle of free association."' 2 This is
an unfortunate misstatement. It clearly follows that the moral right of
freedom of association precludes shop cloture since compulsory associa-
tion or membership denies the freedom of association. Freedom to asso-
ciate means the freedom not to associate, otherwise there is merely the
compulsion to associate. The author correctly pointed out that the right
to life outranks the right to work. 3 However, we should not overlook
the fact that in a complex market economy in which most individuals
are employees, the right to work becomes necessary to sustain the right
to life. Closing the doors to employment or even narrowing the doors to
employment in the various ordinary vocations of life well may have the
practical effect of interfering seriously with the right to life itself.
*Instructor in Economics, College of Commerce and Business Administration,
University of Illinois.
1 Fitzpatrick, Morality of Right-To-Work Laws, 2 CATHOLIC LAWYER 91 (April
1956).
2 Id. at 97.
3 Id. at 93-94.
RIGHT-To-WORK (Morris)
In discussing the area of both intrastate
and interstate labor left open to state legis-
tion, meaning the possible prohibition of
compulsory union membership, the author
concludes that "Right-to-Work" laws are
"morally indifferent" legislation. 4 He sug-
gests that the problem may be compared
to the taxing power of a public corpora-
tion. At least three questionable premises
are involved in the reasoning which he
developed: First, that the union benefits
the reluctant worker; second, that the
union, a private and self-seeking organi-
zation, may be equated with a public cor-
poration; and third, that morality inheres
in the use of government power to com-
pel reluctant individuals to support gov-
ernment projects. Morally, all social or-
ganization, including government, is for the
benefit of individuals, not the other way
around. Insofar as there is a departure from
this concept, there is a departure from
morality.
To suggest that the legislator need not
take notice because "the possible damage
to the individual is minimal" 5 is of ques-
tionable validity as moral principle. The
most that can be said is that some wrongs
work lesser injuries than do others. In addi-
tion, it should be noted that in practice this
opens the door to collectivist philosophy
through the implicit suggestion that the wel-
fare of the reluctant individual may be dis-
regarded in order to advance the group. We
may conceive of morality and immorality as
being at opposite'poles. If a small degree of
damage to the individual may be morally
disregarded, this moves the base or criterion
of morality one degree further towards the
4 Id. at 95-96.
5 Id. at 96.
pole of immorality. And a further move-
ment of one degree from this new base like-
wise presumably may be justified on the
grounds that it is minimal! Practically, this
seems to be the way by which collectivists
move continually towards submergence of
the individual. Thus, today, a vast degree
of socialism is accepted in the United
States and continual moves towards more
socialism are justified on the grounds that
a small additional degree is of minimal
injury to the individual and presumably is
of great benefit to the collective mass.
But to come to the heart of the matter
raised by Mr. Fitzpatrick, we must turn
elsewhere. Insofar as the author suggests
that there is moral justification for shop
cloture, he does so on the grounds that shop
cloture may be necessary to enforce stand-
ards, to prevent wage cuts. 6 Thus he is con-
cerned basically with the results of the com-
petitive market mechanism. The nature and
functioning of the market mechanism is a
complex matter which cannot be developed
in this brief space. 7 A few of the elements
of the problem may be examined however.
The author contends that it is immoral for
a worker to displace another by accepting
a wage lower than the other has been re-
ceiving.8 The reasoning involved therein
also is the case for restricting output to the
level of the least productive in order to pre-
vent a more-productive worker displacing
the less-productive worker. Indeed, there is
no substantive difference between displac-
6Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, passimn (especially
pp. 97-107).
7 See Knight, The Determination of Just Wages,
in TWENTIETH CENTURY ECONOMIC THOUGHT
465 (Hoover ed. 1950) for a discussion of wage
determination.
8 Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 97.
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ing a worker by accepting less pay for the
same work and displacing him by doing
more work for the same pay. Indirectly,
adoption of the author's reasoning leads to
adoption of the socialist slogan or prin-
ciple, "from each according to his ability;
to each according to his need." Manifestly,
uniform output and wage standards would
compel such low levels of production and
consumption that such standards are re-
jected. And, of course, the socialist notion
is equally impossible. The difficulty arises
in that wages are payments for services
rendered and the values of the services
which different people are able or willing
to render are of varying worth. And these
varying values are determined by causes
quite apart for the most part from the nature
of the market mechanism which is an or-
ganizing and facilitating device.
The author, because of his preoccupation
with the maintenance of "standards," says
that an industry-wide strike in the coal in-
dustry would be justified because a com-
mon standard is involved. 9 This overlooks
the fact that this is merely the exercise of
union monopoly power. The apparent
strike against the commercial operators
really is merely bargaining through the em-
ployers, as intermediaries in the market,
with the consumers of coal. It is the use of
the coercive force of collective action to
take what is wanted by a producer-minority
group.
The mere erection and maintenance of
fixed "standards" cannot be surrounded
with an aura of morality. Indeed, competi-
tive forces cause standards to rise towards
the level of the most efficient and produc-
tive producers rather than vice versa, as
witness the historical trend of real wages in
9 Id. at 104.
the United States. There is a far greater
morality in freedom-which is a primary
moral value in itself-plus flexibility and
growth of the economy, which benefits all
in the long run, than in the maintenance of
the inflexible standards of monopoly by
producer-minorities.
Mr. Fitzpatrick tries to justify shop
cloture in certain circumstances on the
grounds of material benefits-the main-
tenance of "standards"- allegedly flowing
from unions. The pastor of the Sacred
Heart Church in Staples, Minnesota has
said succinctly:
Man's personal freedom is not something
which he owes to society, or something that
society must at times disregard for mate-
rial advantages, but something anterior to
society and something upon which all Chris-
tian civilized organization must depend.
When we see this we have the proper
notion of Christian freedom; when we
fail to see it, we deny the very founda-
tion of morality, substituting utilitarianism
for ethics. 10
Group price fixing by labor unions func-
tioning as bargaining agents for bargaining
units (and binding reluctant workers) is
the partial socialization of wages and labor
since the relevant issue in socialism is
power or control. Very grave moral and
ethical problems are involved in the con-
tinuing trend towards the elevation of the
"group" and the submergence of the in-
dividual. Shop cloture to facilitate the
maintenance of monopoly standards can-
not be justified morally since this is the
improper use of force. Force may be em-
ployed morally only to resist the pressure
of immoral force or power.
10FALQUE, THE TRUE PURPOSE OF RIGHT-To-
WORK LAWS (Heritage Foundation).
